


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Johann Friedrich Herbart

A Study in Pedagogics

BY

A. M. WILLIAMS, M.A.

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Preface

The article on Herbart in Rein's *Encyklopædisches Handbuch der Pädagogik* is supplied with references and a bibliography on a scale by which one can measure the greatness of Herbart's influence. Potent as that now is, it took some time to declare itself. Seventy years have passed since the death of the teacher-philosopher, and his *General Pedagogy* was published more than a century since; but it is only within the last forty years that his doctrines have become popular even in Germany, while twenty years ago his name was hardly known among English-speaking peoples. At Jena, since 1885, Dr. Rein has been the centre of a Herbartian propaganda, and has attracted teachers from all parts of the world, among them a considerable number of American, a smaller number of English, a still smaller number of Scottish, teachers. An illustration of the way in which Herbartianism has spread is afforded in the writings of M. Gabriel Compayré. In his *History of Pedagogy*, first published in 1879, he made no attempt to expound the ideas of Herbart, contenting himself with one or two general observations on the emphasis laid by Herbart on the connection between psychology and pedagogy.

By 1906 the spread of the new teaching led him to devote a monograph to Herbart, and thereby to introduce to his countrymen a great teacher whom they were ignorant of, while the rest of the world was eagerly studying and applying his doctrines. In the United States Herbartianism is the fashionable pedagogy, although already, to a certain extent, it is being countered by the influence of Dewey. In this country it has enthusiastic disciples, but it has to struggle against opposition to its philosophic groundwork and to its conception of how character can be built up. It is prejudiced also by misunderstandings as to what Herbart means by interest and instruction, and as to his position towards habit and training. Moreover, his realistic account of the growth of mind is repugnant to some who turn with more appreciation to Hegel, whose influence in education is beginning to be felt both in the United States and here.

This little volume offers in brief an account of Herbart's views on the theory and practice of education, and of the way in which these are related to his philosophy. It is meant to serve as an introduction to fuller study of a great subject. The gradual spread of Herbartianism makes it imperative that teachers and others interested in education should understand what it means. Compayré is "convinced it will last and proceed still further; that a day will arrive when there will be found in other lands besides Switzerland and Germany, even in the village schools, hard-working teachers who

have recourse to Herbart for safe guidance, or at least for suggestive inspiration, fitted to sustain them in practical teaching". A movement like this must be examined with care by those responsible for education. For the teacher it is still more important to learn that underlying all his work is a theory of man and of life. To Herbart this is a vital truth. To him "education is not a trade like other trades; it is a sacred mission". To feel this is to make one diffident of one's sufficiency for a calling so lofty and so exacting. Yet without such a feeling how can one sustain the daily toil and the many disappointments of the schoolroom? Herbart seems specially worthy of attention just because he regards the teacher as a living epistle as well as a prepotent influence. Really to believe this, and to labour to realize it, is to find in teaching one of the noblest and most fascinating pursuits.

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JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART

Herbart is one of a notable triad who found in philosophy the groundwork of a theory and practice of education. Plato, Hegel, Herbart. Plato's speculation on Ideas moulded the educational scheme of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, and informed his teaching in "the olive grove of Academe"; it is Grote's opinion that "among his contemporaries he must have exercised greater influence through his school than through his writings". Hegel drew from that subtly-woven philosophy whose secret is possibly still to seek, the pedagogy that underlies his school addresses and the principles that guided him in his office as Rector of Nürnberg Gymnasium. Herbart took an active part in the philosophical disputes of his age; as the "father of modern psychology" he

became the author of a scientific pedagogy; as private tutor, private docent, and university professor he had wide-ranging experience as a teacher.

LIFE OF HERBART¹

Herbart's father, a lawyer in Oldenburg, where he commended himself to his fellow citizens as a reliable man of business and affairs, seems to have counted for little in Herbart's development as compared with the future philosopher's mother. A woman of marked mental power, she transmitted this to her son, and did him a further service by watching over his early education. Owing to a certain delicacy of health, caused by falling into a vessel of very hot water, Herbart did not go to school till he was in his thirteenth year; and during this important period his mother paid the closest attention to his upbringing, choosing his tutor with judicious care, sitting with him during the lesson hours, and even

¹ Special acknowledgment is due to Miss M. K. Smith's translation of Herbart's *Text-book in Psychology*; Mr. and Mrs. Felkin's translation of his *Science of Education*; Dr. Davidson's *A New Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology*.

learning Greek that she might understand her boy's work and if necessary help him with it. At a later stage she accompanied him to Jena when he entered the university there, and helped him to make the acquaintance of such men as Schiller. All this made for the presentation to Herbart's youthful mind of a mass of well-chosen ideas, and the son never ceased to be grateful to his mother for all he owed to her.

Herbart made an admirable pupil. He forbids us to speak of innate faculties, but very soon he gave evidence of unusual capacity. A **Early Characteristics.** powerful memory, a ready and penetrating comprehension, ability to think clearly and accurately, were splendid qualifications for the life of a scholar; while his relish for mathematics and physics, for literature and music, testified at once to the range of his tastes and powers, and also to the richness of his environment. It is easy to see that just as Locke's profession and constitution led him to dwell long on the physical side of education, Herbart's own experience underlies his theory of "many-sided interest". Like Macaulay he saw himself in every schoolboy, who thus became a

being with a high potential of development. In the manner of John Stuart Mill, Herbart began logic and was handling philosophical questions before he was in his teens.

From 1788 to 1794 Herbart was a pupil in the Gymnasium at Oldenburg, and **School and University.** gratified his teachers by the assiduity with which he laid broad and deep the foundations of his studies. To exceptional capacity he added unremitting industry; he combined a taste for ancient learning with a keen interest in the intellectual movement of his time; while all was ordered by a mind to which logic was congenial.

From 1794 to 1797 he was at the University of Jena studying philosophy, in the golden prime of German thought. Fichte was lecturing at Jena, Kant at Königsberg, Schelling and Hegel were thinking out their systems; and among them those thinkers were building up an empire against which Napoleon's whiffs of grapeshot availed nothing.

The great problems of philosophy were faced by Herbart with the confidence of an original mind, and quite early he asserted his independence of his teachers.

Solitary wrestling with the issues raised led him to question the positions of the idealists. While still a youth of twenty he found himself unable to accept the teaching of Fichte or the theories of Schelling; and a few years later, in 1802, when he was proceeding to the doctor's degree, he formally opposed the doctrine of Kant. But it must not be supposed that there was any touch of arrogance in the young scholar; he had the warmest admiration for the philosophers he criticized, but the effect of their teaching was to provoke in his mind a contrary line of thought. He was essentially a realist, resting on experience; and his view of education, towards theories of which he was already turning, led him to reject the idea of transcendental freedom, of a will that can will what it ought independently of all influence. He figured to himself the individual acted on by, and reacting against, the whole body of experiences that make up his environment. At this time, too, his reading of Homer led him to form a decided opinion as to the fitness of that poet to supply material for the early curriculum.

In 1797 Herbart left the University to become private tutor to the three sons of

Herr von Steiger, the governor of Interlaken. It was a happy opportunity for both instructor and pupils. On the one hand, Herbart, who had already perceived the connection between education and philosophy, was stimulated by contact with growing minds to pursue a fruitful enquiry, and, from the circumstances of the case, had leisure to develop and to check his theory and method of education. He saw how intimately related to the teacher's work is psychology, and therefore made a close study of that subject; and, as he proceeded to apply it in fixing his curriculum and teaching the subjects chosen, he found his way to some of his most characteristic doctrines. He refused to make the common distinction between instruction and education; through the first he aimed at achieving the second. He found in the *Odyssey* the ideal reading-book, capable of awakening interest, because it appeals to the universal spirit of youth. He did for his three charges what had been done for himself; he touched their minds at various points in order to bring to birth in them a many-sided interest. He saw, moreover, how much the school depends on the

home. On the other hand, the boys were taught by one whose interest in them and in their common work was itself a most powerful stimulus, while they had the further advantage of a tutor in whom knowledge and a natural taste for teaching were combined with scientific method and a zeal for thoroughness. Herbart started from carefully gathered facts, including observations on the character of his pupils, and was ever guided by these in determining principles and methods. His success is indicated in the five letters that have been preserved out of the twenty-four in which he reported to the father on the studies and progress of the boys, and in the friendly relations he established and long maintained with his pupils.

By 1799 Switzerland was caught in the maelstrom of the French Revolution, and the turmoil interfered with such peaceful labours as Herbart's. **Pestalozzi.**

Moreover, philosophy, his early love, was calling to him with a voice not to be denied; and his recent contact with youthful minds had served to sharpen his zest for the subject that, in his view, was inseparable from education. Before leaving Switzerland he visited Pestalozzi at Burg-

dorf, and found there an inspired man applying, as well as his lack of training would permit, those principles of method that Herbart bases on his psychology. Both saw in sense-perception the beginning of mental life, and therefore recognized the importance of the child's experience, while this led again to the significance of the teacher as responsible for the material to be presented to the child. Both saw also that there is an order in which subjects should be introduced into the curriculum, and that this is determined not merely by the relation of the subjects to each other, but still more by their harmony with the growing needs and capacity of the child. But what Pestalozzi divined rather than clearly comprehended and turned to use in the elementary stage, Herbart had thoroughly worked out as a method applicable to the whole field of education.

After spending two years at Bremen, where he extended his studies in philosophy and got further experience **Göttingen,** 1802-9. in teaching, Herbart proceeded to Göttingen, where he lived from 1802 to 1809. By this time his mind was teeming with ideas on education. When

he offered himself at Göttingen for his doctor's degree, the theses he presented were purely pedagogical, and, on becoming a lecturer in the University, he discoursed on pedagogy as well as philosophy. His income was of the smallest, but he was cheered by such proofs that his lectures were appreciated that he refused promotion to a higher post at Heidelberg University, and amid all the distractions and privations of the Napoleonic wars pursued his career of student and teacher. His system of thought was rapidly formulating itself. In 1802 he published pamphlets on Pestalozzi's *How Gertrude teaches her Children* and *The A B C of Sense-Perception*, and revealed the importance he attached to observation. These were soon followed by his two notable works on educational theory, *The Æsthetic Revelation of the World* (1804) and *General Pedagogy* (1806). In addition, during this fruitful period he published works on metaphysics, logic, and ethics.

In 1809 Herbart was called to the Chair of Philosophy at Königsberg, and he regarded it as a peculiar honour **Königsberg, 1809-33.** that he should be thought worthy to occupy a position that had been

succeeding

held by Kant. For nearly a quarter of a century Herbart lived a strenuous life at Königsberg, devoting himself particularly to completing his system of psychology and developing the practical side of his pedagogy. In 1816 he published his *Text-book in Psychology*, in 1824 *Psychology as Science*, in 1828 *General Metaphysics*, which completed the statement of his case against current philosophical views. These works by no means represent the whole of Herbart's literary activity during this prolific Königsberg period, nor did speculation and authorship exhaust his abounding energy. He lectured with ever-growing popularity, and the crowded audiences stimulated him to give them of his best. Recognition of his capacity and reputation came freely from many quarters, and Herbart found himself possessed of "honour, love, obedience, troops of friends". He was supported in his manifold activities by a happy home life: in 1811 he married Mary Drake, the daughter of an English merchant resident in Germany, and she proved a veritable helpmeet for him.

At Königsberg Herbart reduced to practice Kant's saying, "We need Nor-

mal Schools and experimental schools", and there started a movement that is only now receiving adequate **Herbart's Seminary.** attention. He saw that to talk pedagogy is not enough, that, while education is a science it is also an art, and he proceeded to devise a scheme under which his students could apply and test his theories. What he aimed at was a combination of demonstration and criticism lessons with observation and experiment. A Teachers' College ought to provide not only lectures on the theory and history of education, and opportunities for seeing model lessons and getting practice in teaching, but also a field for observation and experiment, where facts can be collected and theories and methods proved and tested. It is one of the great things Herbart did that he planted in the minds of some at least the conviction that in this kind of laboratory work lies the hope of building up a really sound system of pedagogy. Herbart found in his seminary a place where he could demonstrate his favourite thesis that the best reading-book for boys is the *Odyssey*. Like Hegel he found in the classics the choicest nutriment for the growing mind.

By 1831 the Prussian authorities were looking askance at the Universities as **Göttingen again, 1833-41.** nurseries of a dangerous liberalism, and innovators in education were included in the condemnation visited on all progress. Some twenty years later the time was to come in Prussia when Kindergartens were to be prohibited because of their revolutionary character, and Froebel was to be suspect. In Herbart's day the reactionary spirit was strong enough to deprive him of the nomination to the Chair of Philosophy at Berlin in succession to Hegel, and he was glad to leave Königsberg and go to Göttingen to take the place of Schulze, who died in 1833. At Göttingen Herbart continued his literary labours and lectured to large and appreciative audiences. On August 9, 1841, he lectured as usual, and there was no hint of the fatal apoplexy that struck him down two days later and caused almost instant death.

HERBART'S LOGIC

Herbart's view of logic as a body of general method suggests how the subject may be turned to account by the teacher.

An illustration was given by J. S. Mill in his Rectorial Address at St. Andrews when he spoke of grammar as "elementary logic". The epithet "elementary" is not very happy, but the words serve to remind one of what is involved in teaching formal grammar. The subject calls for some familiarity with the principles of definition and classification, for knowledge of how to proceed to construct a definition, of how to test a definition, of what constitutes a sound system of classes. Further, what logic has to say about names, concepts, propositions, and arguments, is valuable to the teacher, helping him to clear thinking and clear speaking, and enabling him to guide aright the pupil's search for knowledge. Again, logic concerns itself with observation and experiment and the experimental methods as instruments for discovering truth, the relation of the sciences to each other, and the general method of ordering thought—all supremely important to the teacher. Logic is therefore properly made a subject of study at training centres for teachers, though possibly there is still room for improving its correlation with school method.

**Logic a body
of General
Method.**

HERBART'S METAPHYSICS

In Herbart's time the dominant philosophy was idealism. All that is, was looked on as the creation or the expression of mind. As regards the external world, Kant expressed the position thus: "There are no other than thinking beings, the other things which we believe ourselves to perceive are only ideas of thinking beings, ideas in fact to which there is no corresponding object outside of or beyond the thinking beings"; that is, philosophy would not accept the existence of things independent of their relation to being perceived. If, in the ultimate analysis, this seems to limit knowledge to the sensations of the individual mind, there is an equal difficulty in assuming an outer world as the starting-point of experience, since this takes for granted our knowledge of things in themselves apart from a perceiving mind.

In his attempt to define what is meant by the real, Herbart began, in the manner of Socrates, with an examination of concepts, with a search for the true meaning of words. All knowledge

rests upon experience, but the resulting concepts are contradictory, and the contradictions must be cleared away if knowledge is to be in harmony with experience. One of the contradictions alleged by Herbart consists in this, that a thing is thought of both as a unity and as a multiplicity, that is, an assemblage of qualities. Since the multiplicity is a fact of experience it must be accepted, and is to be explained as an aggregate of simple real existences united in a formal, but not a real unity. This is Herbart's theory of atoms or "reals"—simple, unchanging, independent beings, which have an independent existence and at the same time can be cognised.

After this fashion a bridge is built between idealism and realism, and substantially this is the view favoured by Bergson, who expresses his **The Middle Way.** own position thus: "Matter is an aggregate of 'images'. And by 'image' we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a *representation*, but less than that which the realist calls a *thing*,—an existence placed halfway between the 'thing' and the 'representation'." Bergson utters a warning that the readers of Herbart must keep

in mind, namely, to make sure that objections to his views do not imply a return to either idealism or realism.

As Lotze saw, a difficulty inherent in this theory of absolute atoms is to explain how a thing while preserving its identity may yet undergo change. **Disturbance and Self-preservation of the Real.** Herbart's solution has the merit of novelty, and has a bearing on his favourite doctrine of apperception. All phenomena are the result of the interaction of two or more "reals", which are by hypothesis unchangeable in their quality, so that the "new" must spring from the condition of reciprocal opposition.

HERBART'S PSYCHOLOGY

In psychology as everywhere Herbart takes as his starting-point experience.

Psychology and Experience. Following Locke's plan, he looks into his mind and finds there self-consciousness, and in his own manner proceeds to "rectify" this concept. He finds the notion contradictory, inasmuch as the self is not only the observer—the subject-self, but also the observed—the object-self; there is appar-

ently, therefore, a duality, and yet there is a unity, since the observer is identical with the observed. Further, while the analysis of the self yields nothing but transient modes of consciousness—feeling, thought, and will, a difficulty is felt in calling these states the self, and the consciousness of identity is held to involve the assumption of an underlying substance to which all the independent phenomena of consciousness are referred. It is the purpose of his psychology to resolve these contradictions by determining the true nature of soul and of conscious states.

The soul¹ is a simple unchanging essence or being, without a multiplicity of states, activities, or powers. It is one of **Soul** the “reals” of which Herbart regards **defined.** the universe as composed, and has its seat in the pons of the brain; on this Wundt remarks that, if one were asked to lay one’s finger upon a part of the brain that by its complexity of structure and the number of elements it compresses into a small space should illustrate the composite character of the physical substrate of the mental life, and therewith show the absurdity of any

¹ Soul is here used as equivalent to mind. In strict speech soul is the mental substance lying behind mind.

attempt to discover a simple seat of mind, one could hardly hope to make a happier choice. The question, however, of the locality of the soul does not affect the conception of what it is. Its very nature prevents it from being thought of as a substratum of faculties, or from being known in itself apart from its presentations.¹ These are its self-pervations, due to the interaction between the soul, or ego, and the other "reals" of the universe.

The soul, then, has no innate ideas or faculties; it is not known at first as intellect, will, feeling, for all mental processes are born of the interactions among presentations, and these have come from without. They come, in the first instance, through the senses, and constitute elements of which other presentations are composed. From the interaction of the presentations arise abstraction, judgment, comparison, reason, self-consciousness, memory, imagination, &c., the whole body of faculties by which the mind is known, and which are therefore derivative and not primary.

Herbart's view of the soul has been severely criticized. Compayré, for example,

¹ Presentation is used by Herbart to include both perception and idea as the mental picture of an object not actually sensed.

quotes his description: "It has originally no ideas, desires, or feelings. Itself knows nothing of itself, nothing of **Is this a** the external world. Still more, **real Soul?** it has no forms of perception, such as Kant conceived, no laws of will or of action, no sort of predisposition remotely related even to all that; its nature is entirely unknown"—and then observes that "one might just as well say that it does not exist". Compayré speaks of the soul as looking on at the interplay of ideas, and of Herbart's having transferred to the ideas the activity of which he has deprived the soul. Now, in reading this and other similar criticism, one has to remember that to Herbart the soul was "a real", and that one's first duty is to try to get at Herbart's own point of view. In the first place, Herbart was neither an idealist nor a materialist; he believed in the existence of "reals" underlying all phenomena, and he denounced materialism as an absurdity. In the particular case of the soul, Herbart postulated a simple homogeneous monad as the "real" underlying all mental phenomena. What exactly did he mean? His position that the underlying "reals" cannot be sensed is a perfectly familiar one. If we take

away from gold its attributes—hardness, colour, weight, ductility, and so on—what is the thing itself that is left? Clearly “its nature is entirely unknown”, and hence two very different estimates of what it is. “To me,” says Reid, “nothing seems more absurd than that there should be extension without anything extended, or motion without anything moved;” on the other hand, Fichte holds that “Attributes synthetically united give substance, and substance analysed gives attributes; a continued substratum, or supporter of attributes, is an impossible conception”. In this dispute Herbart is with those that assert the existence of “reals” behind all phenomena, although he admits that we are conscious only of phenomena. The peculiarity of his position, however, as regards the soul is that he looks on knowing, feeling, and willing as derivative and not original states, and this is thought to be tantamount to deposing the soul as a “real”. According to current psychology the soul, or mind, is known in its earliest state as intellect, will, feeling; the question as to what, if anything, underlies those is left open, but it is not evident that, as regards the assumption of a mental sub-

stance, there is anything to differentiate Herbart's theory from that of any other philosopher that makes this assumption. Admittedly the soul is known only by its functions, direct knowledge being impossible; but this does not imply, and Herbart does not teach, that there was no pre-existence prior to the manifestation of activity. In his account of the cosmogony of the Babylonian poem *Enuma elish* Dr. Johns writes: "Then the gods are manifested; the word does not mean 'come into being' simply, for it is used of the stars appearing at night and implies pre-existence". In like manner, on Herbart's theory, the soul, although pre-existing, is known only as functioning, and, although the functions as we know them are derivative, they spring from the various relations of the soul to other "reals"; and these relations are due to its simple quality. Whatever one may think of the theory, it does not imply that there is no soul, or that the soul, having once acted, thereupon, as it were, retires from business, and allows the presentations to follow their own devices. On the contrary the soul *is*, and is to be found among the presentations.

This question involves another, that

of individuality,¹ which Herbart's critics would deny as a possible implication in his theory. On this subject Herbart himself is most emphatic. "The individuality of the youth", he says, "reveals itself more and more under the teacher's efforts, and fortunate is he (the teacher) if that individuality in no way combats his efforts, or, by giving them a crooked direction, causes something different to be developed, which neither teacher nor pupil would desire." Again, he draws attention to "a negative rule in relation to the aim of education, which is as important as it is difficult to observe, i.e. to leave the individuality untouched as far as possible". It would be easy to multiply such quotations, but these two will suffice to indicate Herbart's own view of what he thought his theory of the soul implied. One may of course still ask whether he was entitled to think so. There are two questions: Does his theory of the soul, or mind, allow for an original individuality? Does his theory of the growth of mind leave room

¹ It is argued that, on Herbart's theory, the same experiences should produce the same type of mind, that is, minds without individual characteristics.

for individuality? As regards the first, the presentative activities by which the soul is known are the consequences of its relations to other "reals", and the power of entering into these relations constitutes the original individuality. As regards the second, Herbart says: "The mind of an adult, consisting of knowledge and imaginings, of resolves and doubts, of good, bad, strong, weak, conscious and unconscious opinions and inclinations, is put together differently in the cultured and uncultured man, in Germans, Frenchmen, and Englishmen; how it is put together, the individuality of the man determines". This complex reveals the soul as functioning, and in the development of its functioning the development of the soul is seen, since the soul is not separable from its presentative activities. The continuity of these activities constitutes that identity which marks mental personality, or individuality in the sense of the self. Individuality is also used to mean the traits that distinguish one individual from another, and it is in this sense that Herbart uses it in the passages quoted above.

According to Herbart the soul has no innate natural talents or faculties what-

ever, either for the purpose of receiving or for the purpose of producing; and this conception of the soul is held to be fatal to such views of education as take it to be a process of drawing out or of training the latent powers of the child. **Faculties.** Objection, therefore, would be taken to the definition of education given by the founders of the Prussian National System, namely, "the harmonious and equable evolution of the human powers", on the ground that the powers are not there to be evolved but have to be created. "We still hear people", says Professor Welton, "talk of training various faculties by special kinds of mental work, as if these mysterious powers were independent organs which could be trained separately by exercise—as, for instance, the arm could be trained apart from the rest of the body, and, once trained, could be used to do any form of appropriate work." Professor Welton's objection lies against language that implies the training of isolated powers—he admits that the *mind* as a whole can be trained—but it expresses the opinion of Herbartians with regard to the theory that a boy should study mathematics in order to become a good *reasoner*. As they view the matter,

the only power the mind can receive from a subject as an instrument "is the particular instrument's power, but not power in the abstract". Dr. Davidson takes grammar as an example, and states the case thus: "The subject grammar, as an instrument, will work on and modify in some way the object—mind; but it will do so only as a grammatical instrument, and the result will be a grammatical result".

The idea of training is so persistent in educational theory and practice that some attempt must be made to realize clearly the point at issue. According to Herbart we must stop short at the facts of inner experience, that is, sensation is unknown to us before we have sensed, will before we have willed; the faculties are merely generalizations from experience, and to give them an independent existence is a form of Conceptualism. Wundt thinks Herbart's objections go too far and prevent us from attributing any effect to gravity as a cause, and that, if the facts of the inner experience are to be termed manifestations of mind, it is the result of a natural conceptual construction to speak of faculties when the effect and the cause are both within the object. More-

over Herbart admits the concept force, but makes a distinction between it and faculty. Wundt gives reasons why the distinction is valid between the concept of force as a concept of relation and the concept of faculty as a force that awaits an opportunity to produce its effect, but he regards as a mere hypothesis Herbart's contention that the idea is the real and only contents of the mind, and that feelings, emotions, impulses, are merely the resultants of the momentary interactions of ideas, and denies that it is supported by the exact analysis of experience. He also points out, as Professor Welton has just done, that Herbart's "reduction of all mental processes to ideation is a survival from the intellectualism of previous psychological systems".

The mere fact that we are not conscious of faculties prior to experience would not be regarded by all thinkers as conclusive proof that they are not innate; those, for example, that hold the idea of space to be intuitive might admit that we are not conscious of this idea prior to knowledge of extended things. But, without going further into the region of speculation, we may ask whether, on any theory of the

mind, the doctrine of formal training is untenable, whether to hold this doctrine really implies a faculty psychology. It is common enough to speak of training the memory, but it is extremely doubtful whether the exercise of the memory in any particular direction improves memory in general. "The memory for places is intensified by habitual attention, the consequence of our special avocations; an engineer or an artist remembers places, not by superior general memory, nor even by particular memory, but by the strain and preference of attention, accompanied by neglect of other matters. Instead, therefore, of speaking of the cultivation of the faculty of memory, we should simply consider the means of fostering some definite class of acquisitions, according to the established laws of Retentiveness" (Bain). Dr. Stout's remark that "Exercise of the memory in the study of languages will do little to improve it for the retention of chemical formulæ", means that we cannot develop by the study of one subject a memory-power applicable to another subject that does not supply identical or analogous experiences. The same kind of criticism applies to the injunction to culti-

vate the judgment. A judge of horses has to attend to a variety of points,—to note differences and agreements, to apply an ideal standard, and so on. At a higher level the literary critic who undertakes to compare Burns and Goethe as lyrists is engaged in a similar task, but he and the judge of horses are not interchangeable; either would cut a poor figure if entrusted with the duties of the other. In both cases we have a result of special knowledge and experience, which is not properly speaking the cultivation of a faculty. Is there nothing, then, gained in any study that is not limited to the study itself? Is there not such a thing as mental discipline? Undoubtedly there is. We learn to arrange in the most helpful way the points and circumstances to be compared, to assemble for examination the particulars relevant to a definition, to test the definition, to handle the syllogistic forms and the inductive methods, but these things are learned by learning *them*. It comes, then, to this, that formal training is a training in form as an object of training. Botany, for example, may yield only information about plants, but it is capable also of yielding information about method, pre-

eminently about the methods of classification; but it is quite possible for a student to get the first kind of information, and little or none of the second in such a way that he can apply it elsewhere. This is because the second kind has not been attended to. Formal training, therefore, is not an inevitable by-product of some other educational process such as learning mathematics; it is itself an educational process requiring separate consideration, such as it receives in a very special degree in logic. Still less is it a sharpening of some entity named faculty; nor is it a process of drawing out, but one of building up.

What about moral training? Here especially a distinction is made between form and content, between an inner and an outer experience, between that which comes to us and the mode in which we meet it. Yet the training cannot be separated from the material of training. If we train a child to curb certain tendencies and to give free scope to others, these active impulses have an object; they do not operate *in vacuo*. The practical question is whether, as time passes, there emerges from tried situations something that will meet untried situations. The child is given to instan-

taneous action; the adult has learned, more or less adequately, to deliberate, and has learned this from experience of the ill consequences of haste. Thus, when confronted with a new situation, the adult is guided by past experience to handle it promptly if it resembles others he has previously dealt with, or to proceed cautiously if it presents unfamiliar features. In either case, he shows the result of training, which is to be explained, however, not as the sharpening or the drawing out of a faculty, but as the accumulation of experience.

Is there anything besides experience? According to Helvetius, "Everything that we have and everything that we
Heredity. are, we owe to the external world; nor is man himself aught else but what he is made by the objects that surround him". Minds are different solely because they have come under different influences, so that it should be possible to determine the circumstances that go to the formation of a poet and to make Shakespeares a drug in the market! On such a view it would be unnecessary to discuss the effect of heredity on a child's character, which would be independent of the parents'. At present there is an acute dispute as to whether the

modifications induced in the lifetime of individuals are transmissible to their offspring, but, if Helvetius be right, the discussion is a waste of time, since inheritance is then not a factor in the education of the child, which depends wholly on the environment. The other extreme is represented by Schopenhauer, who is of opinion that "Education can make nothing of a man".

As we have seen, Herbart denies to the soul innate or inborn talents or powers, and claims that all mental phenomena arise from presentations, and in so doing would seem to make education independent of heredity and omnipotent in the formation of character. There are, however, two qualifications of this extreme position. On the one hand, he finds the starting-point of advancing culture in individuality and the horizon of the individual as determined by opportunity. On the other hand, bodily differences (due partly to inheritance and partly to individual variation) are reflected in psychical manifestations; the body may check or stimulate the mind and thus affect the process of education.

The presentative activities of the soul reveal it to us as far as it can be known

at all; they are the soul in action. These presentative activities are the contents of consciousness, presentations, ideas, and Herbart explains how these behave towards each other. In consciousness they combine in two ways. Red clover has two well-known characteristics, its bright colour and its sweet taste; the presentations—redness and sweetness—are said to form a complex; along with these presentations, so unlike that they admit of no comparison, is another—greenness—which forms a contrast to redness, and unites with it in what Herbart calls a blending, or fusion. “Complexes may be complete; blendings (fusions) from their nature must always be (more or less) incomplete.” An example of a complex is supplied in the mother-tongue, words and thoughts being so closely connected that we seem to think by means of words; an example of a blending is the presentation of a spire and that of its æsthetic relation. There may be opposition between presentations so that they tend to arrest each other or to exclude each other from consciousness. Thus, while one is examining the red clover, the song of the lark may be heard,

and there is a struggle between the opposing presentations, with the result probably in this particular case that both are diminished in intensity, but neither is wholly driven below the threshold of consciousness. On the other hand, if we suppose that the sight of the clover and the song of the lark are experiences in moments of relaxation from toil, all that belongs to our accustomed labours is for the time below the threshold of consciousness, but ready to rise up again as the arresting conditions are removed. "All the concepts (presentations) which, as we are accustomed to say, the memory preserves, and which we well know can upon the slightest occasion be reproduced, are in a state of incessant striving to rise, although the condition of consciousness is not at all affected by them." It is an essential part of Herbart's theory that presentations are indestructible, for they are the soul-activity, and to destroy this would be to destroy the soul itself. "The presentation must yield without being destroyed; that is, the real presentation is changed into an effort to present itself." In other words, as soon as the arrest is removed, the presentation by its own effort

will again make its appearance in consciousness.

The discussion has now reached Herbart's great doctrine of Apperception, the process whereby new knowledge is interpreted through the old, and it becomes possible to make new acquisitions. Dr. Stout defines apperception as "the act by which a mental system appropriates a new element". The "mental system" is the whole group of complexes, blendings, and oppositions, built up into an "apperception mass", or "circle of thought", so that all mental activity is a reaction between our new experience and our old. "After a considerable number of presentations in all kinds of combinations is present, every new act of perception must work as an excitant by which some will be arrested, others called forward and strengthened." In other words, certain ideas already apperceived lay hold on the new idea with which they have some affinity and make it part of the apperception mass; their power to do this will depend upon the thoroughness with which they themselves have been apperceived, and that depends on the efficiency of the teaching.

“So far as it represents or conceives, the soul is called *mind*; so far as it feels and desires, it is called the *heart*, or *disposition*. *The disposition of the* **Intellect.** *heart, however, has its source in the mind*—in other words, feeling and desiring are conditions, and, for the most part, changeable conditions of presentations.” Herbart speaks here of three functions of the soul—intellect, feeling, and will, the second and the third being dependent on the first, and all being the product of presentations. The interaction of the presentations gives birth to all the phenomena of intellect—conception, judgment, reasoning, &c.

The relation of feeling to presentations is set forth in Herbart's explanation of the origin of pleasant feeling. “A presentation comes forward into **Feeling.** consciousness by its own strength, at the same time being called forward by several helping representations. Since each of these helps has its own measure of time in which it acts, then the helps may strengthen one another against a possible resistance, but they cannot increase their own velocity. The movement in advancing takes place only with that velocity which is the greatest among several pre-

sentations meeting together, *but it is favoured by all the rest.* This favouring is part of the process which takes place in consciousness, but in no way is it anything represented or conceived. Hence it can only be called a feeling—without doubt a feeling of pleasure. Here is the source of the cheerful disposition, especially of joy in successful activity.” The phenomenon thus described is familiar enough. It is, for example, the joy with which we make a fresh step in learning, the satisfaction of utilizing the ideas we already possess to add to our store. If Herbart’s mode of expression means only that when the soul functions as intellect, it also functions as feeling, there is no need to cavil at it. “The very same state of mind may have both an intellectual and an emotional side; indeed, this is a usual occurrence. And, like many things that are radically contrasted, as day and night, these two distinct facts of our nature pass into one another by a gradual transition, so that an absolute line of separation is not always possible; a circumstance that does not invalidate the genuineness of their mutual contrast.” But Herbart seems to mean something more than this, namely,

that feeling is only a mode of the presentations. Feelings, he says, "are changeable conditions of presentations", so that, as the presentations change, the feelings change, and this is true. As one becomes more intellectual, one's whole emotional attitude becomes modified, but this concomitant variation proves at most a causal connection; which is probably quite enough for Herbart's purpose, namely, the reaching of the whole mental life through instruction. It is equally true that to cultivate the feelings is to cultivate the intellect, that, for example, as a child's pleasure in looking at pictures grows, its intellectual activity in relation to pictures also grows; this is so even although it has to be admitted that no pleasure at all in relation to pictures would be possible in the absence of presentations. This is only an illustration of the reciprocal relation of intellect and feeling; in the same way, although reasoning presupposes judging, it is nevertheless often present after a fashion in simple acts of judging. It should be noted, further, that the sensations of organic life, those connected with the processes of circulation, respiration, and digestion, for example, "contribute

little of the permanent forms and imagery employed in our intellectual processes"; and this point is hardly met by Herbart's classification of them as "feelings that arise from the nature of that which is felt", and are therefore of less importance from a practical, i.e. a moral, standpoint.¹ Finally, a feeling may stimulate, confuse, or paralyse the intellectual processes, as when rivalry gives a new vivacity to intellection, anger distorts the judgment, or fear makes it impossible. Conversely, as in Darwin's case, great intellection tends to aridify the whole emotional field.

"A complex $a + a$ is reproduced by a concept (presentation) furnished by a new act of perception similar to a . Now **Desire.** when a , on account of its combination with a , comes forward, it meets in consciousness a concept (presentation) opposed to it, β . *Then a will be, at the same time, driven forward and held back.* In this situation, it is the source of an unpleasant feeling which may give rise to *desire*, viz. for the object represented by a , provided the opposition offered by β is

¹ It is noteworthy that the sexual emotion may exist in the absence of all knowledge of its meaning.

weaker than the force which *a* brings with it." The sight of the lawn suggests the delights of the putting-green, and forthwith golf distracts the mind from its present occupation, and may come above the threshold of consciousness with such force as to overpower the focal presentations and provoke *desire*. This may lead to the abandonment of work and a visit to the golf course, that is, to *desiring* has been added *willing*. This addition does not always take place. One may desire something that is hopelessly beyond attainment, e.g. a golfer might desire to be another Vardon, but in most cases this is only a pleasant dream; if, in spite of unattainability, the desire persists and grows stronger, there arises what is called Obstructed Desire, a markedly painful conscious state. Professor Ward restricts the name "desire" to "Obstructed Desire", but Herbart does not. "There is a great difference between a strong will and a strong desire. Napoleon willed when emperor, and desired when at St. Helena. The expression desire must not be so limited as to exclude those wishes which remain, though they may be vain or so-called pious wishes, and which, for the very reason that they do remain, constantly

incite men to new efforts, because through them the thought of a possibility is ever anew suggested, in spite of all reasons which appear to prove the impossibility of attainment. It is very important to give to the presentation of the unattainability of the wished-for object strength enough so that a peaceful renunciation may take the place of the desire. A man dreams of a desirable future for himself even when he knows it will never come." There are, then, three elements to be considered. Take the case of the presentation of golf confronted with the presentation of work: the three elements are the idea, the active tension, and the accompanying feeling; that is, as the idea of golfing gains in strength, there is a struggle to realize it in full actuality, and, until this realization is in sight or accomplished, there is pain, which ceases and makes room for pleasure when the idea of work is finally submerged. Now, on Herbart's theory, the functioning of the mind as intellect has other two aspects—desire and feeling—which are not to be thought of as separate independent faculties.

Among the conative elements are certain primitive movements which Herbart classes among the lower faculties of desire; such

are, for example, the restless activity of children and young animals—a kitten is said to be given to frantic rushes at nothing and stopping before it gets there, the reflex movement of blinking, when something rapidly approaches the eyes, and the action of swallowing, which may take place during unconsciousness, or walking, which may take place when one is asleep. Such movements, which to some psychologists are the foundation of will by supplying the child with experiences, are not dictated from without, and hence Herbart regards them as results of the organism, and consequently physiological rather than psychological. The relevant point is that they are not due to a represented end or to feeling; like appetite, which is accompanied by feeling, and unlike desire, they are independent of presentations. Herbart naturally lays stress on the inclinations. “The inclinations, or those lasting mental conditions which are favourable to the rise of certain kinds of desires, show themselves more than the so-called instincts to be different in different people. They are for the most part results of the habit which appears to extend from the faculty of representation into the faculty of desire.

For there are, first, the thoughts which follow the accustomed direction, and which, if no hindrance intervenes before there is opportunity for perceptible feeling and desire, pass directly into action; but, if something is placed in the way, then the desire, accompanied by a feeling of effort and fatiguing activity, increases." It is manifest that to control the thoughts is to control the desires and the will. If the teacher can accumulate and strengthen the right kind of presentations and withhold or starve the wrong kind, the child's thoughts will run in the proper direction, and his desires will follow them. It will be observed that Herbart speaks of *habit*, meaning that habitual ideas will be followed by habitual desires. This enters into his whole doctrine of character formation and of the teacher's suasory function. The will is to be reached only through the feelings and the intellect. The object held up for pursuit must be realized as desirable, and the hearer or reader must be convinced that it is attainable. The desire for the object depends on the strength of its presentation, which belongs to intellection. But, however strong the presentation may be, it will not be effective unless there is

a memory of feeling ; we desire to renew an experience that we remember as pleasurable ; in the case of a new experience, we have to be convinced that it will bring us something that we remember as desirable.

“Will is a desire accompanied with the presupposition of the attainment of that which is desired. This presupposition becomes united with the desire when, **Will.** in similar cases, the effort of action has been followed by a result, i.e. by success ; for then the presentation of a period of time which contained the gratification of the desire, suggested by association the beginning of a new similar action. From this arises a glance into the future, which glance is continually extended in proportion as a man learns to use more numerous means to secure his ends.” A spectator at an exhibition of athletic feats might *desire* to emulate some of them, but, if conscious of his inability, would not *will* to do so. On the other hand, one fairly expert at a game, on seeing a master of it display a new dexterity, might both *desire* and *wil* to rival it. His own past experience leads him to think himself capable of like skill, and *desiring* the end he *will*s the means. His *glance into the future* sees the possibility

of such a combination of movements as will bring about the desired result. When he has attained the desired efficiency, as in making a particular stroke at cricket, he is unaware of either desire or effort; in the moment he realizes that a ball admits of it, the stroke is made, the presentation and the act are almost simultaneous. This is the consequence of what is called **Habit**, which, in Herbart's view, operates in moral as well as in manual acquisitions; by habit the child does the right thing in conduct as in drawing, and in both cases this follows upon knowing; habitual knowing precedes habitual doing.

How is the willing to be described? Kant conceived the will as possessing transcendental freedom, that is, a freedom independent of experience. On this theory "man has a two-fold character—an *empirical*, determined by experience, intercourse, temperament, &c., and an *intelligible* (absolute capacity), which exists as a thing in itself transcendental, that is, outside experience, time, and all chains of causation, and thus is not determinable, but determines only". Such a will can will what it ought, "morality depends on a free resolution without any external incentive", and

hence Herbart renounced absolutely the doctrine of transcendental freedom on the ground that it negatives the whole idea of education, since manifestly it is vain to attempt to form character if man possesses an inward absolute freedom, which *ex hypothesi* is beyond the reach of external influences. Herbart's own conception of the act of willing is different. "When a decision, the result of a completed act of deliberation, is on the point of presenting itself, it often happens that a desire arises and opposes this decision. In that case a man does not know what he wishes—he regards himself as standing between two forces which draw him towards opposite sides. In this act of self-consideration he places reason and desire opposite each other as if they were foreign counsellors, and regards himself as a third, who listens to the two and then decides. He believes himself to be free to decide as he will. He finds himself sufficiently rational to comprehend what reason may say to him, and sufficiently susceptible to allow the enticements of desire to influence him. If this were not so, his freedom would have no value; he would only be able to incline blindly in this or that direction,

but he would not choose. Now, however, the reason to which he gives heed, and the desire which excites and entices him, are not really outside of him, but within him, and he himself is not a third on a level with those two, but his own mental life lies in each and works in each. Hence, when he finally chooses, this choice is nothing but a co-operation of those two factors, reason and desire, between which he thought he stood free. When a man finds that reason and desire in their co-operation have decided over him, he seems to himself not to be free, but rather subjected to foreign arts and influences. Manifestly, this is again an illusion, and from exactly the same source as the first. Just because reason and desire are nothing outside of him, and he nothing outside of them, the decision which arises from them is not foreign, but his own. He has chosen only with self-activity, yet not with a force different from his reason and from his desire, and which could give a result different from those two." In other words, the self-activity that chooses is part of the consciousness that includes presentations, these and the self-activity forming a unity. Willing involves (1) the presentation of

something desired, (2) a presupposition of attainability, (3) activity, three different aspects of soul activity. Willing, that is to say, arises in and because of presentations; "will springs out of the circle of thought", the good will is born of the good thought. While this is so far true, and while it is also true that will cannot be known in the abstract apart from the presentation in which it reveals itself, there are circumstances that qualify the Herbartian doctrine. As has been seen, there are activities independent of experience, and these supply experiences of pleasure and pain that lead to repetition or discontinuance while the child's cognition is still extremely feeble. "The process of acquirement may be described generally as follows: At the outset, there happens a coincidence, purely accidental, between a pleasure and a movement (of Spontaneity) that maintains and increases it; or between a pain and a movement that alleviates or removes it; by the link of Self-conservation the movement bringing pleasure or removing pain is sustained and augmented. Should this happen repeatedly, an adhesive growth takes place, through which the feeling can afterwards command the movement." Again,

the will exercises a powerful control—inhibitive or stimulating—over both feeling and intellect; it becomes strong enough to crush down the most rebellious feelings and to guide the current of the thoughts. Further, the will can be trained “not indirectly, but directly, by its proper exercise in sustained effort, resistance to temptation, and so forth”; no doubt it has to be trained on something, that is, as Dr. Stout puts it: “Conative development is inseparably connected with cognitive development. . . . Differentiation of conative consciousness is differentiation of cognitive consciousness. This does not imply that conation is secondary to and dependent upon cognition. What is meant is rather that conation and cognition are different aspects of one and the same process.” The truth is that the mental functions are so mutually involved as to tempt psychologists to inquire which is the most fundamental, and so one finds it to be the intellectual function, another the conative, and another the affective. The practical teacher has to bear in mind that the three functions are inextricably interlaced, so that in affecting one he affects all. Herbart’s doctrine means that the mind works as a *whole*, and that only be-

cause of this can the teacher secure that goodwill which is the true end of education.

Such is an outline of Herbart's highly ingenious psychological system, which is condemned by Wundt and others because it relies too much upon intellectualism, and by Dewey and others because it is "essentially a schoolmaster's psychology, not the psychology of a child". "It is", says Dewey, "the natural expression of a nation laying great emphasis upon authority, and upon the formation of individual character in distinct and recognized subordination to the ethical demands made in war and in civil administration by that authority. It is not the psychology of a nation which professes to believe that every individual has within him the principle of authority, and that order means co-ordination, not subordination."

HERBART'S PEDAGOGY

Nevertheless this psychology has been the source of a most stimulating pedagogy which is drawing to itself an ever-growing body of adherents and practitioners. Con-

**The Importance
of the
Individual.**

trary to the common judgment, Herbart neither desires that education should be omnipotent, in the sense of compelling each child into the same mould, nor maintains that it can be. "The art of arousing a child's mind from its repose—of securing its trust and love in order to constrain and excite it at pleasure, and to plunge it into the whirl of later years before its time, would be the most hateful of all bad arts if it had not an aim to attain which can justify such means even in the eyes of those whose reproof is most to be feared. 'You will be thankful for it some day', says the teacher to the weeping boy, and truly it is only this hope that justifies the tears wrung from him. Let him be careful that, in overweening confidence, he does not too frequently have recourse to such severe measures. Not all that is well meant is thankfully received, and there is a weak spot in the class of that teacher who, with perverted zeal, considers that as good which his pupils only experience as evil. Hence the warning—do not educate too much; refrain from all avoidable application of that power by which the teacher bends his pupils this way and that, dominates their dispositions, and

destroys their cheerfulness." This attitude led Herbart to object strongly to Fichte's central idea with regard to the purpose of education. The circumstances of his time caused Fichte to advocate education under State control in order to awake the civic and military spirit and the duty of love to God, King, and Fatherland. Herbart distrusted such opinions, because they seemed to make too much of the citizen and too little of the man, and also because they seemed to threaten family life, "the ground on which education ought to grow". He saw in them the seeds of an evil that since his time has developed with threatening strength, the tendency of parents to take no responsibility for a share in the education of their children, but to leave the whole matter to the State, and even to refrain from using the means at their disposal to enlighten the State as to their opinion of the educational system pursued. He knew quite well that the home is often a defective place of education, but he looked forward to a time and a means of making it a true co-operator with the school, and he asked that there should always be between the two institutions a bond of interest and

sympathy in their common task of promoting the development of an *individual* man. "Undiscerning parents may drill their sons and daughters according to their tastes—they may lay all kinds of varnish on the unpolished wood, which in years of independence will be roughly rubbed off, but not without pain and injury. The true teacher, if he cannot prevent all this, will at least not participate in it. . . . He makes it a point of honour that the clear impression of person, family, birth, and nationality may be seen undefaced in the man submitted to his will." This self-restraint of the teacher is indeed dictated by individuality, whereby "each thing is differentiated from others of the same species". This individuality "is the mysterious root to which our psychological conjecture refers everything which, according to circumstances, comes out ever differently in human beings". In like manner, although Locke says, "'Tis that [Education] which makes the great difference in mankind", and again, "I imagine the minds of children as easily turned this way or that way as water itself", he also says: "God has stamped certain characters upon men's minds which,

like their shapes, may perhaps be a little mended, but can hardly be totally altered and transformed into the contrary."

By his emphasis on individuality and the need of developing the individual man, Herbart led the way towards that child study which

Child Study.

promises to make teaching a more interesting and attractive field and a more fruitful enterprise. He says, it is true, "that the teacher must represent the future man in the boy, consequently the aims which the pupil will as an adult place before himself in the future must be the present care of the teacher; he must prepare beforehand an inward facility for attaining them"; and thus seems to countenance the idea now generally rejected that children are to be treated as undeveloped adults; and, as has been seen, his psychology is charged with being "not the psychology of a child". Whatever truth may lie in these criticisms, and it would not be difficult to show that they are inconsistent with a true comprehension of Herbart's theory of interest, it is the fact that, in Herbart's view, we cannot teach unless we know the child *as he is now*; and it is the purpose of child study to get hold

of this knowledge. The subject cannot be fully treated here, but one or two illustrations may be given of what is to be gained from observation of the individual. "It may be assumed", says Bain, "that in the early part of the day the total energy of the system is at its height, and that towards evening it flags; hence morning is the season of improvement." On the other hand, Münsterberg points out, "Experiments demonstrate various rhythms and curves of fatigue for the whole day's work. There are some who are freshest in the morning, others who are freshest in the afternoon. And while examinations of whole classes hide these individual differences, a careful study shows that almost every individual has his own distribution of greatest efficiency and easiest fatigue. Some are at their best after a night's sleep and become tired during the day; others are in a still half-asleep state and through the small stimulations of the day they awake more and more, until late in the day they are at their highest power. The individual differences of fatigue demand very different distributions of effort in order to secure the fullest efficiency. In the best case all general

rules only compromise between the needs of the different individuals, and these compromises can do little toward levelling the variations, as such fundamental types of fatigue tendencies seem to remain characteristic for individual nervous systems."¹

Success in teaching depends on the discovery of such individual variations and the accommodation of the conditions to them, but clearly this implies much smaller classes than are found at present in primary schools. Take another illustration, this time of the way in which a general mental law may have to be interpreted by actual experience. "Every seed", says Herbart, "recalls the plant from which it started, and points forward to that which may arise from it, while at the same time it suggests the use which may perhaps be made of it without planting it." Are all these things suggested to the same individual? If not, what determines the suggestion of any particular one? The answer is found in Dr. H. J. Watt's experiments on the influence of purpose in the control of associations. "He asked men to give

Some striking examples of how the results of mere introspection are checked by exact experiment will be found in Brown's *Mental Measurement*.

the first word that came into mind after a printed word was shown when first one, then another task had been set. It was found that the word suggested always, and automatically, corresponded to the purpose dominant through the task that had been set. Not only the course of the association, but the average time required to make response, and the character of the sensory image, varied with each purpose. These facts are convincing proof that the purpose is fully as important as the direct connection in determining the course of ideas." Thus, to take Herbart's case, to the botanist peas would suggest the plants that bore them, to the amateur gardener the plants that would spring from them, to the housewife Scotch broth or some other dish to which they would contribute; all of which illustrates Herbart's teaching about the relation between interests and presentations. Teachers that have caught the spirit of Herbart will be eager to ascertain the individuality of the children to be taught and to modify their teaching accordingly. It may be added that child study is still at a stage where much fresh material is required, and that this can be supplied by teachers with a competent knowledge of

psychology and the love and sympathy needed for the interpretation of the child mind.

"The art of Education", says Bain, "assumes a certain average physical health, and does not enquire into the means of keeping up or increasing that average." This limitation of the art is not admitted in the theory or the practice of to-day, which take as their guide the dictum, "The first requisite to success in life is to be a good animal". The revelations of recruiting officers during the last South African war led to a demand for the medical inspection (which has, as its corollary, the medical treatment) of school children, and the provision of suitable physical instruction and recreation grounds. Herbart found the basis of all disposition in physical health. "Sickly natures feel themselves dependent, robust ones dare to *will*. Therefore the care of health is essentially a part of the formation of character, though without belonging to the science of education, where even the first principles for that care are wanting." True to his conception of the unity of human nature, Herbart cannot omit the physical factor in education; the connec-

tion of soul and body and their co-operation make it impossible to ignore physical education, but, like many other educationists, he would "feel compelled to give a warning note against making physical health and strength the principal aim of our national wellbeing. Far more important really is our intellectual supremacy, and immeasurably more important is our moral and spiritual prowess." With this utterance Herbart would have agreed.

For him the aim of education is summed up in one word—Morality. "We might **The Aim of Education.** assume as many problems for education as there are permissible aims for men. But then, this would involve as many educational inquiries as problems, which would have to be carried on irrespective of their mutual relationships, and it could not be seen how the teacher's separate measures are to be limited, or in what way they might be carried out. We should find ourselves much too poor in means, if we tried to attain every individual aim directly, and that which we intended only to effect singly, might have tenfold results from secondary and accidental causes, so that all parts of the work would be thrown out of their right propor-

tions. This point of view is thus unsuitable for approaching the consideration of educational questions as a connected whole. If it is to be possible to think out thoroughly and accurately, and to carry out systematically, the *business* of education as a single whole, it must be previously possible to comprehend the work of education also as but one. Morality is universally acknowledged as the *highest* aim of humanity, and consequently of education." This is the all-embracing aim; "education does not work for the vocation in life". This is a necessity of the case. "How can the teacher assume for himself beforehand the merely *possible* future aims of the pupil? The objective of these aims as matter of mere choice has absolutely no interest for the teacher. Only the Will of the future man himself, and consequently the sum of the claims which he, in and with this Will, will make on himself, is the object of the teacher's *goodwill*; while the power, the initiative inclination, the activity which the future man will have wherewith to meet these claims on himself, form for the teacher matter of consideration and judgment in accordance with the idea of *perfection*. Thus it is not a certain number

of separate aims that hover before us now (for these we could not beforehand thoroughly know), but chiefly the *activity* of the growing man—the totality of his inward unconditioned vitality and susceptibility. The greater this totality—the *fuller, more expanded, and harmonious*—the greater is the perfection, and the greater the promise of the realization of our goodwill.” Herbart is pleading here for that many-sided interest in which morality is rooted, since moral culture is so related to the other parts of culture that it presupposes them as conditions from which alone it can with certainty be developed; “that the ideas of the right and good in all their clearness and purity may become the essential objects of the will, that the innermost intrinsic contents of the character—the very heart of the personality—shall determine itself according to these ideas, putting back all arbitrary impulses—this and nothing else is the aim of moral culture.”

It will be seen that in Herbart's eyes there can be no education without instruction. “I have no conception of education without instruction, just as conversely I do not acknowledge any instruction that does not

**Education
through
Instruction.**

educate. Whatever arts and acquirements a young man may learn from a teacher for the mere sake of profit, are as indifferent to the educator as the colour he chooses for his coat. But how his circle of thought is being formed is everything to the teacher, for out of thoughts come feelings, and from them principles and modes of action." This is the corollary of his psychology, and has been criticized by critics of the psychology as well as by others that regard it as a variation of the teaching of Helvetius, and as leading to an exaggerated view of the importance of the schoolmaster. The fear is expressed that Herbartianism must produce an excess of mere instruction and a restriction of the pupil's initiative. Herbart, however, expressly warns his readers against allowing either of these things to be a consequence of his teaching. Many-sidedness of interest must be distinguished from its exaggeration—dabbling in many things, but it must exist in the Herbartian sense. "The interest which a human being feels directly is the source of his life. To open many such sources, and to cause them to flow forth plenteously and unchecked, is the art of strengthening human life, and at the same

time of fostering love of one's kind. If each of these interests is as varied as the achievements of many individuals taken together, then the latter are united in one bond by a happy necessity. On the contrary, when each individual cares only for *his* own business or avocation, and all besides is but means to this end, society is a machine, and each member of it keeps his life warm at a single spark, which may be extinguished, and then nothing remains but dismal coldness, satiety, and disgust." Herbart, in fact, asks in familiar phrase for "the harmonious cultivation of all the powers"; and, as what he asks shall be known is to be held not in isolation—"whatever is isolated is valueless"—but as part of an apperceptive mass of ideas, and is to become this by concentration and reflection, it is clear that Herbart gives no sanction to the diffusion of mental energy or the accumulation of unrelated facts. "Synthetic instruction, which builds with its own stones, is alone capable of erecting the entire structure of thought which education requires," and as such it has nothing in common with what is stigmatized as "the giving of information". Again, throughout the whole process of building

up apperception masses, the pupil's own individuality and activity count for most. "The individual grasps rightly what is natural to him," and his individuality reacting on his opportunities determines "the starting-point of advancing culture." Not less important is the pupil's self-activity in the sphere of moral culture. "*A making' which the pupil himself discovers when choosing the good and rejecting the bad*—this or nothing is formation of character! This rise to self-conscious personality ought without doubt to take place in the mind of the pupil himself, and be completed through his own activity; it would be nonsense if the teacher desired to create the real essence of the power to do it, and to pour it into the soul of the pupil. But to place the power already existent and *in its nature trustworthy* under such conditions that it must infallibly and surely accomplish this rise—this it is which the teacher must look upon as possible, which to attain, to affect, to investigate, to forward, and to guide, he must regard as the great object of all his efforts. . . . The formation of character attains certainty of result just in proportion as it is quickened and trained in the period of

education. And this is possible only by making youths, even boys, active agents early. Those who grow up merely passive, as obedient children, have no character when they are released from supervision. They give themselves up to their hidden longings and to circumstances, now when no one has any longer power over them, or when any power that can still perhaps be exercised, affects them in but a crooked manner, and must either drive them off at a tangent or crush them altogether." Let it be noted that the teacher who accepts the Herbartian doctrine of the power of ideas to evolve all mental states and to form character, necessarily carries into his work a deep and solemn sense of responsibility.

Herbart's concept of interest plays a leading part in his pedagogy. It is necessary, in the first place, to realize **Interest.** what he means by *knowing*. A good deal of criticism has been directed against his proposition that right willing depends on right thinking. "Instruction will form the circle of thought, and education the character. The last is nothing without the first; *herein is contained the whole sum of my pedagogy.*" "*Ignoti nulla cupido!* The

circle of thought contains the store of that which by degrees can mount by the steps of interest to desire, and then by means of action to volition. Further, it contains the store upon which all the workings of prudence are founded—in it are the knowledge and care without which man cannot pursue his aims through means. The whole inner activity, indeed, has its abode in the circle of thought. Here is found the initiative life, the primal energy; here all must circulate easily and freely, everything must be in its place ready to be found and used at any moment; nothing must lie in the way, and nothing like a heavy load impede useful activity. Clearness, association, system and method must rule here. Courage will then be sustained by the certainty of the *inner* performance, and rightly so, for the external impediments which unexpectedly appear to the foresight of a careful intelligence, can terrify him but little, who knows that, with altered circumstances, he can at once evolve new plans." What is asked for in this second passage is "perfect cognition, that is, a cognition fulfilling three conditions: first, that it holds for true a proposition that really is true; second, that it is perfectly self-

satisfied and free from the uneasiness of doubt; third, that some character of this satisfaction is such that it would be logically impossible that this character should ever belong to satisfaction in a proposition not true" (C. S. Peirce). On this knowledge the subject *acts*. The confidence with which an expert acts is due to the perfection of his knowledge and the number of times he has applied it with success. The habit of knowing has generated the habit of doing; the ideas are so vivid and dominant that they easily pass into action.

The question then arises, How do ideas become so vivid and dominant? In *School-boys and School Work*, Mr. Lyttleton says: "A young man may be ignorant of very many truths without being a discredit to his school, but he becomes a discredit as soon as ever he shows a reluctance to go on learning"; and there is the undoubted fact that a considerable number of scholars pass out from schools of all kinds without desire to pursue studies of any kind; yet they all have interests. What is interest? "Interest arises from interesting objects and occupations. Many-sided interest originates in the wealth of these. To create and develop this interest is the task

of instruction, which carries on and completes the preparation begun by intercourse and experience." That is to say, what is interesting depends on what has been apperceived. "What is interesting", says Pillsbury, "is identical with the things which, as we have seen above, must be attended to from subjective reasons. They are the things that demand attention, because they are related to our previous experience, because our social environment compels it, or because of hereditary influences. Interest, then, is not dependent upon the object, but upon the nature of the man to whom the object is presented. As we develop, many things become interesting that previously were uninteresting. Interests grow with knowledge, and, in fact, are made by knowledge; they are not fixed once and for all, even in the same individual." Interest, then, is a mental process begun by a presentation related to the presentations already apperceived, and ending in the apperception of the new presentation. The completeness of the apperception depends on the force of the interest, and this on habit. A golfer seeing a new club takes it into his hand, and presently a whole series of movements

follows automatically ; he takes his stance, swings the club, and hits at some object ; a moral character confronted with a crisis, selects the right course and follows it automatically: in both cases the ideas flow in familiar channels. There is a mental alertness in certain habitual spheres; when Lord Goschen asked for "intellectual interest" on the part of workers, he suggested that this is too often absent because their work is a habitual doing without a habitual thinking.

The interest that Herbart wishes to develop is beyond that springing from the **Many-sided Interest.** bent of the child. "The individual grasps rightly what is natural to him, but the more he exclusively cultivates himself in this direction the more certainly does he falsify through his habitual frame of mind every other impression. This the many-sided man should not do. From him many acts of concentration are expected. He must grasp everything with clean hands ; he must give himself wholly up to each one." Natural bent in its strongest form is genius. "The difference in the dispositions which determines what the individual compasses with greater or less facility, must certainly be taken into

consideration. For what is successful will be willingly undertaken and often repeated; and, if it cannot become an aim, it can at least serve as a means. It works consequently as a force to forward other aims, and to strengthen the bent of the mind in that direction. Nevertheless that high degree of success of individual activities which characterizes a special genius, is in no way favourable to the formation of character. For genius depends too much on varying moods to permit of memory of the will; it is not at its own command." Thus the educator must correct the tendency to one-sidedness by cultivating many-sidedness; yet individuality is not to be destroyed; it is to be blended with the character and preserved in it. "We concede, then, that individuality may come into collision with many-sidedness; we do not forget that we declared war against it in the name of the latter, if it would not allow of proportioned many-sided interest. While we, however, at once rejected dabbling in many things, a large sphere yet remains for individuality in which to exercise its activity—to make choice of its vocation, and to acquire the thousand little habits and comforts which so long as no

more value is attached to them than they are worth, will do but little harm to the receptivity and mobility of the mind. The principle has been previously laid down, that the teacher should not make attempts which are beside the aim of education. There are many individualities; the idea of many-sidedness is but one. The former is contained in the latter collectively as the part in the whole. And the part can be measured by the whole; it can also be enlarged to the whole. This has now to be accomplished by education. But we must not picture this enlargement, as if to the already existent part other parts were to be gradually added. Many-sidedness in its entirety floats constantly before the teacher, but diminished and enlarged. His task is to increase the *quantity*, without changing the *outlines*, the proportion, the *form*. Only this work undertaken with the individual does always change his outline, as if from a certain centre point on an irregular angular body a sphere gradually grew, which was nevertheless incapable of ever covering over the extreme projections. The projections—the strength of individuality—may remain, so far as they do not spoil the character; through them the

entire outline may take this or that form. It will not be difficult, after the taste is formed, to unite with each of these a certain peculiar fitness. But the solid content of an interest equably enlarged on all sides, determines the store of the immediate intellectual life, which, since it does not hang on one thread, cannot be destroyed by one stroke of fate, but can merely be diverted by circumstances. And since the moral order of life takes its direction from circumstances, a many-sided culture gives a priceless facility and pleasure in passing on to every new kind of activity and mode of life that may at any time be the best. The more individuality is blended with many-sidedness, the more easily will the character assert its sway over the individual."

There are, therefore, two factors to be considered. On the one hand, education strives to produce many-sidedness by the cultivation of varied interest. On the other hand, individuality has to be allowed for, and this is described by Herbart in terms that imply a heredity with which the teacher has to reckon. "Character, then, almost inevitably expresses itself in opposition to

**Two factors
to be
considered.**

individuality by conflict. For it is simple and steadfast; individuality, on the contrary, continually sends forth from its depths other and new thoughts and desires. Even if its activity be conquered, it still enfeebles the execution of resolves through its manifold passivity and susceptibility. This struggle is not confined to moral characters; every character knows it. For each individual in his own way seeks consistency. The ambitious man and the egoist complete themselves in victory over the *better* traits of individuality. The hero of vice and the hero of virtue, alike complete themselves in victory over self. In ridiculous contrast, weak individuals also exist, who, in order also to have a theory and a consistency, base their theory on the principle of not fighting but letting themselves slide. Truly a wearisome and a wonderful struggle out of light into darkness, out of consciousness into the unconscious. It is at least better to wage it sensibly than in a spirit of blind obstinacy."

The cultivation of many-sidedness involves the control of the soul
The Concept of Interest. activity, which must not be permitted to travel too far in any par-

ticular direction. "The concept of interest, then, took its origin for us in that we broke off, as it were, something from the growths of human activity, in that we in no wise denied to inner vitality its manifold developments, but certainly denied their extreme expression. What is it that is broken off, or that is denied? It is *action*, and that which immediately impels thereto, desire. Desire, therefore, taken together with interest, must represent the whole of an upspringing human impulse. Further, there could be no intention of closing to *all* impulses an outlet in external activity; on the contrary, after we have first distinguished the various impulses by their objects, it will become clear which kind is worthy of a certain development even to its fullest expression." Only in this way can the harmonious development of the individual be secured, namely, through controlling one set of presentations by other sets.

Herbart's distinction between interest and desire is important because on it depends the soundness of his claim that the educator's business is to create interest. "Interest, which in common with desire, will, and the æsthetic

**Interest and
Desire.**

judgment, stands opposed to indifference, is distinguished from those three in that it neither controls nor disposes of its object, but depends upon it. It is true that we are inwardly active because we are interested, but externally we are passive till interest passes into desire or volition. It occupies the mean between mere observation and attainment. This remark helps to make clear a distinction that must not be overlooked, namely, that the object of interest can never be identical with that which is in reality desired. For the desires, while they would fain grasp, strive toward some future object which they do not already possess; interest, on the other hand, unfolds itself in observation, and clings to the contemplated *present*. Interest rises above mere perception only in that what it perceives possesses the mind by preference, and makes itself felt among the remaining perceptions by virtue of a certain causality. The first causality which a presentation more prominent than others exercises over the rest is that it involuntarily represses and obscures them. As it then exercises its power to bring about what we have above termed concentration, we can designate the condition of the mind

so occupied by the word Observation. The easiest and commonest course of this causality, which seldom permits the attainment of a quiescent concentration, consists in the arousing of an analogous presentation by the object observed. If the mind be merely inwardly active, and permits this movement to complete itself, then at most a new act of attention follows. But often the newly aroused presentation cannot immediately come forth; and this is always the case when interest started from the observation of an external reality, and when to this a fresh presentation attaches itself as if the reality moved or changed in a certain manner. So long as the reality delays presenting this progress to the senses, interest hovers in Expectation. The expected is naturally not identical with that which aroused the expectation. The former, which perhaps can now for the first time put in an appearance, is in the future; the latter, on or from which the new can arise or date itself, is the present, on which, in the case of interest, attention, properly speaking, fastens. If the condition of mind changes to such an extent that the mind loses itself more in the future than in the present, and the patience which lies in ex-

pectation is exhausted, then out of interest grows desire, and this makes itself known through the Demand of its object."

An example will make this clearer. There lies before an author a piece of work partly completed, and it calls forward certain presentations which repress and obscure the others. If his interest in the work is powerful—and this will depend on habitual functioning in this particular direction—he proceeds forthwith to carry it a stage further. The state of consciousness between perceiving the work and absorption in continuing it is what Herbart calls Expectation. Meantime, however, another presentation may have come into the field of consciousness, the idea of the reward the work will bring; and desire to have done with the intervening labour predominates over present functioning. But "it is inglorious to be absorbed by desires", whereas "patient interest can never be too rich", and hence the aim of education is to promote interest in the right things. In interest "the character possesses a facility in accomplishing its resolves"; that is, it functions with facility in habitual directions that lead to approved ends. A burglar functions in his operations with facility and

certainly, not troubling about the outcome of his actions, since they are bound to produce their accustomed result; a philanthropist is equally "interested" in dealing with a case of distress. Hence, as Professor de Garmo puts it: "When there is interest in the end to be attained by activity, and also in the means for reaching the end, we have the type of work desirable in education. A direct interest, therefore, should be aroused in the studies as the means of reaching the ends of education; this interest when thoroughly aroused has a reflex influence in developing true ideals of life and conduct. The mental attitude of the sculptor is the ideal one for the pupil, since the interest he feels in the statue as an end attaches to every stage of its creation. When this direct interest is moral, as well as intellectual and æsthetic, then instruction becomes truly educative." Education has to make sure that the right presentations evoke the psychological activity that we call interest, and do so with such habitual force that the others are repressed and obscured.

The creation of many-sidedness involves a succession of concentrations and reflections. Interest means complete absorption

for the time being in what has excited it.

"He who has at any time given himself


Concentration up *con amore* to any object of
and Reflection. human activity understands

what concentration means. For what occupation or what kind of knowledge is so mean, what gain on the road of culture allows itself to be so quickly won, that there is no need to bury ourselves therein, and withdraw awhile from all other thoughts?

As a suitable light is necessary to every picture, as judges of art require a fitting frame of mind in the observer of every work of art—in like manner a suitable attention is due to everything worthy of being observed, thought, or felt, in order to understand it wholly and correctly, and to transport oneself into it." It is clear, however, that such absorption, however necessary for the development of one interest, is incompatible with the development of many interests, and therefore the activity must be cut off in order that concentration may take place in other directions. But these various concentrations are useless unless unified, and this is the work of Reflection, whereby the contents of consciousness are recollected and coordinated, so that apperception masses are

built up. "The acts of concentration exclude each other, and thus even exclude the Reflection in which they must be united. These processes cannot be contemporaneous; they must therefore follow one upon the other; we get first one act of concentration, then another, then their meeting in reflection. How many numberless transitions of this kind must the mind make before a person, in the possession of a rich reflection and the completest power of reverting at will into every concentration, can call himself many-sided." The value of the apperception mass is, however, affected by the nature of the elements that have been welded together. "By no means pure reflection, and consequently no true many-sidedness, in so far as they bring together contradictories. They then either do not combine, but remain lying near each other, in which case the man is scatter-brained, or they grind each other down, and torment the mind by doubts and impossible wishes." This happens when links of connection are lacking, and hence the necessity of knowing the contents of a child's mind—the data supplied by experience and intercourse. "The gaps left by intercourse in the little sphere of feel-

ing, and those left by experience in the larger circle of knowledge, are for us almost equally great, and in the former as in the latter, completion by instruction must be equally welcome." Only the ideas already apperceived can apperceive and interpret the new presentation, and the success of the apperception and interpretation will depend on the links between the new and the old. "After a considerable number of presentations in all kinds of combinations is present, every new act of perception must work as an excitant by which some will be arrested, others called forward and strengthened, progressing series interrupted or set again in motion, and this or that mental state occasioned. These manifestations must become more complex if, as is usual, the presentation received by the new act of perception contains in itself a multiplicity or variety, that at the same time enables it to hold its place in several combinations and series, and gives them a fresh impulse which brings them into new relations of opposition or blending with one another." The teacher must therefore know whether there are in the child's mind such presentations as will respond to the new presentation.



Interest works in six different spheres:— The Fields
of Interest.

1. Interest of Experience, $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a. \text{ Empirical.} \\ b. \text{ Speculative.} \\ c. \text{ Æsthetic.} \end{array} \right.$
2. Interest of Intercourse, $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a. \text{ Sympathetic.} \\ b. \text{ Social.} \\ c. \text{ Religious.} \end{array} \right.$

The subjects drawn from these six spheres are those in connection with which the teacher must excite interest; and, it will be observed, they correspond to a growth of the child mind. A beginning is made with the concrete, what appeals to the senses, what is learned by experience of things; a further step is taken when the child asks, *Why?* and seeks for an answer; a still further step when the child appreciates the beautiful in nature and art, action and character. A child may be interested in a rainbow as an experience in form and colour, or as a phenomenon that demands explanation, or as a thing of beauty. "If sympathy simply accepts the affections it finds in human minds, follows their course, enters into their varieties, collisions, and contradictions, it is merely a fellow-feeling. But it can also abstract the varied affections

of many men from the individuals, it can seek to reconcile their contradictions, it can interest itself in the welfare of the whole, and then again distribute this interest in thought amongst the individuals. This is *social* sympathy. Finally, it can pass over from mere sympathy into fear and hope by contemplating the state of men in relation to their environment. This solicitude leads to a religious need." Herbart does not rest his morality upon religion, but he has much to say on religion, the universal natural principle of which is "sympathy with the universal dependence of men". It should receive early attention from parents and teachers. "The foundations of religious interest must be laid deep and in early life, so deep that in later years the mind rests untroubled in its religion, while speculation follows its own course. . . . Religion befriends and protects, but nevertheless it must not be given to the child too circumstantially. Its work must be *directing* rather than *teaching*. It must not be given dogmatically to arouse doubt, but in union with knowledge of nature and the repression of egotism. It must ever *point* beyond, but never *instruct* beyond the bounds

of knowledge. . . . God is the true centre of all moral ideas and of their illimitable workings, the Father of men and Lord of the world. . . . The Church may maintain relations with the School, but must not dominate it."

It will have been seen that Herbart's interest is not the same as what is interesting, that his pedagogy does not countenance teaching children only what is agreeable to them, and that only by agreeable methods. **Interest and Effort.** According to this view, interest is used to promote the acquisition of knowledge; but according to Herbart knowledge is the source of interest, and interest involves effort, which is strenuously put forth despite all obstacles and pain in order to achieve the purpose that stimulates the soul. Basedow claimed that the methods of the Philanthropists made studies thrice as agreeable, but Herbart does not hesitate to describe the formation of character by instruction as a conflict, and to speak of the hardening of the will. This hardening will not be possible "until we learn how to arrange a mode of life for the young whereby they can pursue, according to their own and, indeed, their *right* mind, what in their own eyes is a *serious* activity".

That is to say, let a purpose interest, and all the means, painful or pleasant, will be faced. If the boy has set his heart on learning to ride the bicycle, he will bear ridicule and the pain of many falls in order to achieve his purpose. The purpose interests because its presentation brings forward many supporting presentations in the mind; it is the teacher's function to increase the number of strong purposes, of presentations that excite the mind to function as interest. In this way the will can be trained by effort to effort; only the effort is a serious activity, not a moral treadmill.

It is usual to speak of direct interest, due to the subject itself, and indirect interest, due to some extraneous motive. Thus one may study mathematics because one is interested in that science, or in order to pass some examination although one may be indifferent to the subject or even dislike it. It is a common school practice to urge a child to its task by praise or blame, the hope of reward or the fear of punishment, but this cannot make the task interesting, that is, the subject-matter will not thereby excite the apperceived presentations to

take up the new ideas; and if not, what has been gained? The usual contention is that the child learns something that will be assimilated later on, but it may be questioned whether the admitted failure of the school to waken a universal real interest in school work, with the result that many leave it practically uneducated, is not due to excessive reliance on what is called mediate or indirect interest. Herbart gives a place to it. "Education constrains, though less abruptly, yet to just the same extent as government, by persistently insisting on that which is unwillingly done, and by persistently leaving out of account the wishes of the pupil. . . . A somewhat closer consideration of the aim of education reveals the fact that the motive of our whole attitude towards children is not entirely consideration *for them only—for the improvement of their mental condition*. We restrain them that they may not be troublesome; we protect them because we love them, and this love is meant primarily for the living being in whom the parents find their joy; and then *after all this* comes a voluntary solicitude for the right development of a future reasonable being." Accordingly Herbart discusses the usual

punishments and rewards. On these one passage may be quoted. "Let the teacher attempt nothing by reward and punishment which will not raise and enhance his personal worth in the eyes of the pupil. If he does not possess this personal affection and esteem, his means will be of little use, he will effect nothing. All single acts of discipline depend on the relation of the whole of education which the teacher has already given the pupil, for all admonitions and warnings call to memory only what is already known. Single disciplinary acts *as* single are worthless, and determine nothing." It has to be admitted that the subject to which we are kept by indirect interest—an obvious misnomer, since the future reward or punishment is a direct interest—often does afterwards enter in a real way into our mental life, but this must be because there is some point of contact between it and the ideas already apperceived, and the question is, whether in many cases it would not be possible by searching to find out this point of contact and to substitute direct for indirect interest.

Attention is a condition of interest. "Attention depends on the relative power

of a presentation to that of others which must yield to it—depends therefore partly on the intrinsic strength of the one, partly on the ease with which the remainder yield. **Attention.** The strength of a presentation can be attained partly through the power of the sensuous impression (as, for example, through the simultaneous speaking of several children, also by the display of the same object in different ways with drawings, instruments, models, &c.), partly through the vividness of descriptions, especially if already connected presentations rest in the depths of the mind, which will unite with the one to be given.” The attention that depends on the strength of the sensational appeal is called primitive; that which depends on previously acquired presentations is called apperceptive, and has been well described by Professor Pillsbury: “A new idea, to receive recognition, must be in harmony with the ideas already present, must be in some way connected with the earlier experiences of the individual. In Herbart’s often-quoted instance, schoolboys who are listless and inattentive during the routine of class instruction become at once interested as the master begins to tell a story. The

ideas already in mind hold no relation to the matter of the lesson, and so are hostile to it; but as soon as the story begins ideas are offered which stand in close relation to the daily life of the hearers—there are other ideas in mind ready to receive and facilitate the entrance of the new. As a consequence attention is awakened, the boys are alert, and the entire room still, except for the words of the tale. So in general what shall be perceived, what shall enter mind at any time, depends almost entirely upon the ideas which are already present. Of course, what are the apperceived ideas at one moment may become the apperceiving ideas at the next. The apperceived impression, therefore, is said to react upon the apperceiving mass in much the same way that the apperceiving reacts upon the apperceived. This aspect of the process is, however, subordinated to the other. The important point is that the course of the mental states at any moment is largely determined by the perceptions of the periods that had preceded it.” Both of these kinds Herbart calls involuntary: voluntary attention implies a strong effort to attend; “it is chiefly necessary when uninteresting matter is to be committed to

memory", and is the attention roused by indirect interest.¹

From his psychology Herbart evolved certain conditions of apperception; and as the aim of every school lesson is to increase the store of the child's ideas (*filling the mind*—this it is, which before all other more detailed purposes ought to be the general result of instruction") and the facility with which they apperceive, these conditions became "formal steps" of instruction. On these Dr. Colgrove, in *The Teacher and the School*, has some useful observations. "These steps have been given various names by different writers, though the terms used by Herbart are—(1) Clearness; (2) Association; (3) System; (4) Method. Among American writers the steps are quite generally known as (1) Preparation; (2) Presentation; (3) Comparison; (4) Generalization; (5) Application. Some writers include the last three steps under the general head of elaboration. The first four steps are mainly inductive. These so-called 'formal

¹ Attention is usually classified as reflex (Herbart's "primitive"), as when music calls our thoughts away from a task; and voluntary, as when there is a purpose to attend (Herbart's "voluntary"), or when this object is interesting (Herbart's "apperceptive").

steps' do not form a strait-jacket to fetter the individuality of the teacher, as some critics seem to think; nor, on the other hand, are they a procrustean bed on which every recitation¹ is to be stretched, for lessons consisting of arbitrary facts or unrelated ideas cannot be taught in this way. Like all general principles, they admit of great variety in their application to details. They do not solve all the problems of method, but they do serve as a standard by which the teacher can measure the correctness of his daily practice, and, once mastered, they contribute very much to the teacher's skill, power, and success in instruction. It is a misnomer to speak of the 'five steps in the recitation', for very often the whole recitation must consist of one or two steps only. Many consecutive lessons may consist of the fifth step alone." He further points out that the pupil, as well as the teacher, has to use the steps. "The formal steps apply primarily to the pupil's mental processes in the act of acquiring knowledge, and therefore apply with special emphasis to the pupil's study of the textbook after the lesson has been assigned. To understand his lesson as he studies it,

¹ A class meeting for an oral lesson.

the pupil must grasp the new ideas by means of his old related ones, compare them, abstract the essential qualities, and form generalizations. In fact, this is the only way that he can really study or think at all, for anything else is a sheer attempt to memorize words that are meaningless to him. Now the proper assignment of the lesson is the first or preparatory step of instruction, and enables the pupil to complete fairly well the next step, or presentation, without the further aid of the teacher. The assignment of the lesson also involves the review of preceding lessons in the light of the added knowledge which the pupil has gained from his most recent study, and may thus afford him the best possible opportunity to apply his knowledge as he acquires it. The purpose of the recitation lesson, then, will not be to discount the pupil's efforts at independent study by treating the lesson which he has faithfully prepared from the textbook as entirely new matter to be 'prepared for', 'presented', 'compared', and 'generalized'. Of course the teacher should review these processes sufficiently well to test the pupil's preparation, suggest comparisons, clear up misapprehensions, strengthen the weak

places, and call for the restatement of definitions and principles; but the greater part of the recitation period should be given to illustrative work, to comparison and generalization, to applying the facts and principles learned from the book to new cases, and to a careful assignment of the next lesson. Where the next lesson assignment introduces a new topic, it may be wise to give nearly the whole of the recitation period to the one step of preparation. Thus it will be seen that when the formal steps in instruction are applied to textbook lessons, the step of preparation is the one that belongs most peculiarly to the recitation lesson, and that it practically constitutes the proper assignment of the lesson. It is clear that the assigning of a lesson will, as a rule, dominate the pupil's method of study, and therefore determine his habits of thinking. There is no doubt that the careless, thoughtless, haphazard way in which lessons are assigned is largely responsible for the average pupil's inefficiency in study. The ordinary method of assigning an arithmetic lesson is to give out so many problems to be solved. The result is that pupils simply read the rule with no comprehension of the principles on which

it is based, look over the model solution in the book, and then try to work the other problems like it. 'Doing sums' in this way is not studying arithmetic. It is at best only a shallow process of imitation utterly stultifying in its effects. Getting a lesson in history or geography, assigned by pages, is usually a still less intelligent process, since there are no model solutions to imitate."

The five steps, then, are Preparation, Presentation, Comparison, Generalization, Application. Herbart himself states them thus: Instruction "must care equally and in regular succession for clearness of every particular (*preparation* and *presentation*), for *association* of the manifold, for coherent ordering of what is associated (*generalization*), and for a certain practice in progression through this order (*application*)".

The absolutely novel will not arrest and hold the child's attention, since there are no associated ideas to apperceive it. "That which is new **Preparation.** is wondered at, but left unconsidered, or condemned by judgment based on recollection." Hence in breaking new ground the teacher must analyse the existing contents

of the child's mind in order to discover the presentations that are related to the matter to be introduced. Through them apperception will take place, and they are, therefore, to be made vivid in consciousness, while other presentations sink below the threshold. The analysis of the existing contents of the child's mind is for the teacher's own preparation, the focusing of the apperceptive ideas and the repressing of those not desired is done with the class. A preliminary step is the stating of the aim of the lesson, which itself starts the gathering of the relevant ideas; "it", says Rein, "the aim of the lesson has been rightly put, it at once produces a flood of thoughts in the pupil". These thoughts have to be put through a process of selection, ordering, and grouping, by means of questioning and free contributions from the class, the teacher guiding his pupils towards the pressing back of the ideas not wanted, and the concentration of those necessary, for the lesson.

The essential old material having been secured by this analysis, the new has now to be brought forward in order
Presentation. that a synthesis may take place, the apperception of the new by the old.

The teacher's great purpose at this stage is to get clearness in the presentations, and towards this all his resources of method must be directed. This clearness involves, in the first place, the child's own intuition, or direct use of the senses, and, in the second place, the child's advance beyond immediate experience; "from the horizon that bounds the eye, we can take measurements by which, through descriptions of the next-lying territory, that horizon can be enlarged". "This species of instruction has but one law—to describe in such a way that the pupil believes he sees what is described." Therefore, the student's English studies have an important bearing on his preparation for teaching. From them he ought to gain a command of the best methods of describing, narrating, and expounding, so as to lift his pupils beyond the limits of sense-experience.¹

The new presentations having been fused with the old and the act of apperception being accomplished, the pupil's fresh incursion into the empirical region, the region of experience, is completed, and he has now to enter on

Association.

¹ On this subject see my *English Grammar and Composition*, pp. 318-355.

the next stage, the apprehension of the relations among the presentations, the search for general notions. "The work of the teacher", says Dr. Colgrove, "is to suggest standards of comparison and correct units of measure, to distinguish superficial qualities from essential ones, to see that the conclusions of the pupils are based upon actual comparison and judgment, to encourage pupils to correct their own false conclusions by closer attention to details and a re-examination of materials, and to connect ideas by the higher thought relations of similarity, design, cause and effect rather than by mere contiguity in time and space."

The next step is to formulate judgments expressing the complete result of the preceding steps. Thus, referring to a series of lessons on the Victoria Cross, Miss Dodd (*Herbartian Principles of Teaching*) says: "The children were all ready to suggest such generalizations as 'We must face danger for the sake of duty'. After listening to various formulations from the children, the teacher said they had all grasped the right idea, but she would give it them in the words of an English poet:

‘Not once or twice in our rough island story,
The path of duty was the way of glory’.

In this step the law, truth, or rule having been clearly brought out by skilful questioning, it is formulated in such a way that the whole group of details is expressed in this formulation.”

The final step is to apply the truth learned, to test its value by applying it to new cases, and to make it vital by putting it to work on the concrete. **Application.**

Herbart himself, let it be said, regarded his steps only as an instrument, and did not intend that they should all be elaborated, whatever the circumstances, irrespective, for example, of the age of the pupils.

The following example is taken from Miss Dodd's *Herbartian Principles of Teaching*, and is one of a series prepared and given by the students of the Women's Training Department, the Owens College. **An Example of the Five Steps.**

AIM.—How can a sea-captain or a sailor find the position of his ship at sea?

I. *Preparation*.—Shape of the earth. A sphere.
It rotates from West to East.

It completes a rotation in twenty-four hours.

The earth is divided into 360° longitude.

The children gave these facts readily from their knowledge gained in previous lessons.

II. *Presentation.*—(a) Light a candle, and hold an orange on a knitting-needle before it so that the light falls on it.

Half of it is in the full glare and half in the shade.

The candle represents the sun, the orange the earth. The part in the glare represents daylight, the part in the shade night.

Which part is having noon? The part exactly opposite the light.

Cause the orange to rotate, and the pupils will observe that various parts of the earth have noon at different times.

Recapitulate.—Various parts of the earth have noon at different times.

(b) Mark the meridian of Greenwich, and cause the orange to revolve as the earth revolves on its axis, and require the pupils to notice whether the eastern or western portion has its noon first.

Recapitulate.—Places West of Greenwich have their noon later than places East of Greenwich.

(c) *Exact difference in time.*—If it takes the earth twenty-four hours to rotate through the 360 degrees, how long will it take the earth to rotate through 1 degree?

$$\frac{24 \text{ hours}}{360} = \frac{1440 \text{ minutes}}{360} = 4 \text{ minutes.}$$

Recapitulation.—One degree of longitude is equal to four minutes in time.

(d) What will be the time at Bordeaux when it is twelve o'clock at Greenwich?

Position of Bordeaux, West of Greenwich (refer to the map). Being West, it will have its noon later than Greenwich.

Bordeaux is 1° West of Greenwich, therefore it will be 11.56 at Bordeaux when it is 12 o'clock at Greenwich.

Problems.—What time is it at Genoa when it is 12 o'clock at London?

What time is it at New York when it is 12 o'clock at Greenwich?

What time is it at Greenwich when it is 4 o'clock at Bombay?

(e) Examine places near the same meridian.

Examples found on the map by pupils:—

London and Timbuctu.

Pekin and Perth in Australia.

Berlin and Capetown.

Recapitulation.—Places on the same meridian have noon at the same time. General recapitulation of the matter in presentation.

III. *Association.*—Associate with knowledge of previous lessons on Latitude, method of finding the time by observing the altitude of the sun, use of Chronometer and Sextant.

How can we discover the time of a certain place? By knowing the longitude.

How can a sailor find the longitude? By knowing the Greenwich time and comparing with the ship's time.

How can a sailor know the Greenwich time? By consulting a chronometer.

How can he find the ship's time? By observing the altitude of the sun.

Why is a knowledge of longitude not enough to

fix the position of the ship? Longitude only shows how far the ship is East or West of a given point. Peking and Perth in Australia are in the same longitude.

What fixes its position North or South of Equator? Latitude.

How does the sailor find his latitude? By discovering the sun's altitude and by consulting a Nautical Almanack.

Having found his longitude and latitude, what must he do further? Consult his chart or map.

IV. *Generalization*.—The exact position of a ship may be discovered by obtaining a correct observation of the longitude and latitude, and finding the exact point on a map or chart.

V. *Application*.—A number of problems bearing upon a knowledge of latitude, longitude, and arithmetic were given to be solved.

While all this leads directly to intellectual culture, that itself is subordinate, although the means, to the supreme end
Moral Culture. of education—morality, the formation of the good will. “The *good will*—the steady resolution of a man to consider himself as an individual under the law which is universally binding—is the ordinary, and rightly the first, thought which the word morality suggests.” Will is “the seat of character, naturally not the changeable wishes and moods of the will, but its uniformity and firmness, that whereby

it is *determinately* this and no other. That kind of the determination we called character—that *which a man wills as compared with that which he wills not*"; character-building is thus will-building. The educator has to undertake this great work of character-building from the foundation. "The child enters the world without a will of its own, and is therefore incapable of any moral relation. At first, instead of a true will, which renders the child capable of determination, there is only a wild impetuosity, impelling it hither and thither, a principle of disorder disturbing the plans of the adults, and placing the future personality of the child itself in manifold dangers." Instead of this wild impetuosity we have to develop a fixity of purpose, but any kind of stability will not do, since there may be an evil determination, and hence the character must be moralized, and its strength must be moral. The will or character has two parts, the objective, the will that exists prior to self-observation; and the subjective, which grows up alongside of self-observation and out of acts of willing and moral judgments; this is the commanding will which gradually develops the "slow pressure which men call con-

science". The growth of this will is aided by what Herbart calls "memory of the will". "A man whose will does not, like ideas held in the memory, spontaneously reappear as *the same* as often as the occasion recurs—a man who is obliged to carry himself back by reflection to his former resolution will have great trouble in building up his character. And it is because constancy of will is not often found in children that discipline has so much to do." This is simply the apperception mass functioning as will spontaneously and without reflection. A similar occasion, or presentation, stirs into activity the will-picture of the previous occasions, and, if the decision is the same as before, the picture gains in vividness; if not, there is a feeling of a lack of harmony between the subjective and the objective will, that which determines and that which is determined, and this feeling may take the acute form of remorse. The habit of doing the right thing tends to the doing of the right thing, only Herbart demands insight and interest as well as action.

As we have seen, Herbart rejects the notion of a soul possessing transcendental freedom—able, that is, to will what it

ought independently of all experience; he also rejects the idea of a reason that addresses imperative commands to the will. The will springs from the circle of thought, which again is built up by presentations, which are the result of experience; it is the growth from single acts of willing, each of which contains a desire and a conviction that it can be realized; but desires are simply aspects of ideas, and hence the importance of the ideas in the mind.

**Morality the
Result of
Experience.**

As the character is built up on right lines there gradually emerge five great Moral Ideas—Inner Freedom, Perfection, Benevolence, Right, Equity. Inner Freedom is that harmony between moral insight and will which arises when our impulses and actions are ruled by our knowledge of the Good; to be free is to be true to our better self; obviously the excellence of this freedom depends on the penetration of our insight. Perfection belongs to the will in action, intense, concentrated, spreading its power over many objects; again, the excellence of this depends on the penetration of our moral insight. While Inner Freedom and Per-

**The Moral
Ideal.**

fection belong to individual morality, Benevolence, Right, and Equity belong to Social Morality; they refer to those situations where one will seeks to satisfy the will of others, or the clash of wills is adjusted by law, or the doing of good or ill calls for reward or punishment. These moral ideas, which become governing principles, spring from action and reflection; they ultimately acquire the force of intuitive æsthetic judgments, which we submit to without feeling the necessity of challenging their ground or authority. Just as thoroughbass asks and wins for its simple intervals, harmonies and progressions, absolute judgments without explaining or proving anything, so we can transfer to the relationships of will an approval or disapproval like those existing for the relationships of notes.

Mr. A. B. D. Alexander gives a synopsis of the teaching of Socrates, some sentences of which read very like the doctrine of Herbart. **To Know is to be Virtuous.** Virtue is knowledge, vice is ignorance. What is done without insight does not deserve the predicate "good". Goodness can be taught, because it is a matter of knowledge. Were

virtue not knowledge, we could not be instructed in it, nor should we be capable of advancing from one stage to another. Socrates went about seeking to convince men not so much of sin as of ignorance. Sin is error. Hence to show men their ignorance is the first step towards right actions. Socrates was not simply a good man who sought to influence others for good. On the other side hear Locke: "For you must take this as a certain truth, that, let children have what instructions you will, and ever so learned lectures of breeding daily inculcated into them, that which will most influence their carriage will be the company they converse with, and the fashion of those about them. Children (nay and men too) do most by example. We are all a sort of chameleons that still take a tincture from things near us; nor is it to be wondered at in children, who better understand what they see than what they hear." And again: "What a man is to receive from education, what is to sway and influence his life, must be something put into him betimes; habits woven into the very principles of his nature, and not a counterfeit carriage; and dissembled outside, put on by fear only to avoid the

present anger of a father who perhaps may disinherit him”.

The student of Herbart does not admit that his teaching ignores either example or habit. The child's experience and intercourse give him his ideas of Providence, “whom he pictures after the image of his parents, and whom he worships after their example”; “the teacher himself will be to the pupil an object of experience, at once as fruitful as it is direct”; “absent historic or poetic characters must receive life from the life of the teacher”; “the governed and the governor, the teacher and the taught, are persons who live with, and inevitably affect, each other agreeably or disagreeably”; “the youth of sixteen begins to take on himself the teacher's work; he has partly appropriated his point of view, he accepts it, and marks out for himself his course accordingly; he manages himself, and compares this self-treatment with that which continually fell to his lot from the teacher”. Yet there is danger here. “The teacher's requirements must not become the pupil's constant thought. For not these, but the true relationships of things ought to be the motive of his actions, and the principle of his idea.

This applies to early youth. Even little children learn to mingle the by-thoughts they have of the people about them in all they do, to such an extent that they are no longer capable of an unmixed feeling." In his history of Loretto School Mr. Tristram, speaking of Almond's influence, says: "The *ipse dixit* of the Head had so much force with his disciples that it became a real source of weakness to his creed. It stopped boys from thinking for themselves." This happened although Almond abhorred conventionality, believed that the training of character is the first and most important work of a schoolmaster, and that this includes discussion of moral questions, and aimed at making his school "a community visibly living according to the dictates of right reason". Herbart duly valued experience, but he would have the child interpret it by the aid of his circle of thought. As regards habit, it underlies the whole of Herbart's teaching. The formation of the will, that is, of character, depends on insight, interest, desire, and action; "action generates the will out of desire". Habitual knowing precedes habitual doing; discipline "works on the circle of thought, predisposing that circle

to adopt certain interests, and thereby co-operating in the determination of character"; it creates or does not create, "through action or inaction, as the case may be, a beginning of character". Education has to promote habitual thinking on the right lines, and to see that is followed by habitual actions.

"The heart will be best trained by the gradual guidance of all feelings and by **Moral Lessons.** lessons of morality, which, since they must never present difficulties to the intellect, must be carefully suited to the age of the child, and never interrupted, because the moral feeling needs increasingly better nourishment. This moral feeling must be given through various interesting representations, which by the approval or disapproval they arouse will lead the child to form principles for himself." This doctrine is strongly opposed by those that think direct moral teaching is wholly objectionable, and who rely on the influence of the school buildings, the traditions, tone and corporate life of the school, games and social intercourse, the personality of the teacher, the curriculum, methods of instruction and discipline and such like; but, in the opinion of Professor Sadler, "there

is a general agreement among experienced teachers that direct moral instruction, when given at the right time, and in the right way, is a valuable element in moral education". The Herbartian position is really this, that whatever good is practised should be understood, but how the understanding is to be secured is to be determined by the teacher, who knows all the circumstances. But there must be understanding; *mechanical* habits belong to the environment that produces them, and decay in a totally different environment.

There is a period prior to that when moral culture is practicable, and during which the child must be subjected to restraint. "It is obvious that the object of child government is manifold; partly avoidance of harm both for others and for the child himself in the present and the future, partly avoidance of strife as an evil in itself, finally avoidance of collision in which society finds itself forced into a contest for which it is not perfectly authorized. It all amounts to this, that such government has properly no aim to attain in the child's soul, but only has to create a spirit of order." The means of government are

**Government
and
Discipline.**

occupation, supervision, threats, compulsion, including corporal punishment; its tone is short and sharp, admitting of no questioning, and enforcing obedience. Even at this stage, however, corporal punishments of all kinds are to be used rarely and with full consideration of the individual punished, and the teacher must always anticipate the time when obedience can be associated with the child's own will; in other words, love as well as authority must guide. But while government may develop a formal morality, "respect for the relationships we find outside our own individuality", it cannot educate, for education means that the individual finds "the general law in his own consciousness". Discipline has this in common with government, that it works directly on the mind; with instruction, that its aim is culture. "Direct action on the youthful mind with a view to form, is discipline," but this direct influence must enlarge the circle of thought and stimulate to those actions that develop will. Mere swaying of the feelings is of little value. "Never ought the teacher to hope anything from mere *agitation*. It would be a misfortune were a wild schoolboy, chastised

one hour for his pranks, not to be up to similar ones the next—a misfortune if his will were so weak and wavering. For then everything accomplished by education would yield in the same easy manner to external circumstances and their impressions. Obstinacy is to be welcomed, for it can be bent. It is only selfishness and malevolence which should not be tolerated.” Discipline has a twofold function; it makes instruction possible, and it works on the circle of thought, predisposing that circle to adopt certain interests; for its purpose it needs constraint, compulsion, rewards, and punishments. It is “continuous, persevering, slowly penetrating, and only ceasing by degrees. It must not affect the mind crookedly, must not be felt as acting against its aims. Discipline finds room only so far as an inward experience persuades its subjects to submit to it willingly.” In other words, unlike the constraints of government, to which the child submits because he *must*, those of discipline are accepted because he *wills*. Necessarily so, for the child has become an adult guiding himself by reason, and the teacher has to prepare for his own supersession. “*Well-earned*

approbation, quietly but abundantly given out of a full heart, is the spring upon which the force of an abundant, convincing, carefully apportioned *blame*, emphasized by the most varied application, must work, until the time arrives when the pupil possesses both praise and blame within himself, and can guide and impel himself by their means." Then the restraining, determining, regulating influence of discipline has done its work. Education, therefore, has three instruments—instruction, government, discipline.

A word or two may be said about two developments of the Herbartian school—**Correlation and Culture Epochs.** "the concentration centres and the culture epochs". The first is an application of Herbart's emphasis on unity if pupils are not to be "scatter-brained"; the second demands that the material of instruction should be in harmony with the psychological development of the child. The idea of building the whole curriculum round one or more subjects admits of being worked out with excellent results; so that, for example, the pupil does not feel on entering the manual workshop that he has broken completely with the history class.

Mr. Tristram, speaking of the correlation of the sciences at Loretto, quotes Professor J. J. Thomson as speaking of the delight and surprise of the wrangler who discovers in the laboratory that his calculations in optics are actually true. "The average mathematical student would not back a formula for sixpence." The theory of the culture epochs, that the stages of culture in the development of the race are paralleled by the stages of mental development in the individual, is a doubtful hypothesis; but it has value as suggesting suitable material for the successive stages of instruction. On these two topics see Chapter VII of *The Demonstration School Record*, No. 1, 1908, edited by Professor Findlay.

What Bishop Mylne said of Almond of Loretto is wonderfully true of Herbart.

"On the purely practical side, I should sum up his special **Conclusion.**

characteristics as consisting in an intense belief that education must be one great whole, including every part of one's being—that character can be trained only if body, soul, and spirit are all being educated together; that mental and bodily health are not two things, but one; that every man can best serve God by making

the very most of himself, and that 'himself' includes, *ex hypothesi*, his soul and his brain and his muscles; and that, when this complex being has been developed in its highest perfection, it can be offered to God only by being used for the benefit of man".

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